Afghan War: In 10th Year, No End in Sight

Entering its 10th year, the war in Afghanistan, which started as a violent, feel-good strike back for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has ballooned into a nasty and dirty conflict whose purpose is unclear and end point unknown.

But the growing price tag -- in money and lives -- can be roughly tracked: on average each month sees $5.7 billion in direct costs and 40 American battle dead and 79 wounded, not counting those struggling with traumatic brain injury as well as combat stress and other non-physical consequences of repeated combat tours.

And no end is in sight. Winning the war, Gen. David Petraeus says, "is going to be a long-term proposition, without question.''

American troops have been deployed in Afghanistan since the first Special Forces, Marines and Army Rangers began landing there Oct. 7, 2001. Within 10 weeks, with the help of spectacular air strikes, they had demolished the Taliban regime which had provided safe haven for Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda operatives who had planned the 9/11 attacks at a mud-walled compound just outside Kandahar.

In the following eight years, U.S. strategy in Afghanistan shifted and drifted and military assets -- Special Forces, intelligence-gathering drones, armored vehicles, ammunition, fresh troops -- were diverted to the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Taliban fighters flowed back across the border from Pakistan, newly trained and equipped, funded by the opium trade and wealthy Gulf extremists. And the relatively few soldiers and Marines there to oppose them struggled and fought and died. In direct engagements, the Taliban proved no match for Americans and allied troops. But the U.S. troops, about 10,000 to 12,000 strong during 2003 and 2004, simply were out-manned.

Administration officials argue that the war didn't really begin in earnest until President Obama took office and almost immediately sent 21,000 troops into the fight and ordered a strategy review to figure out how to win, or end, the war. Rejecting an earlier Pentagon demand that the U.S. "defeat'' the Taliban, Obama declared a new, narrowed goal: to deny al-Qaeda a safe haven, to "reverse'' the Taliban's momentum and prevent it from coming to power, and to strengthen Afghanistan's own army and police.

The last of those Obama "surge'' troops arrived in Afghanistan only a few weeks ago, enabling officials to ask for more patience.

In a meeting with reporters last week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said, " it's really only been, I would say, since the beginning of 2009, with the president's first decision to add another 21,000 troops, and then his decision in December to add another 30,000, and the increase in civilians, that we have actually begun -- and I would say a tripling of the foreign -- of our partners' troops -- that we have actually got the resources in Afghanistan to partner with the Afghans and have some prospect of dealing with a resurgent Taliban.''

Gates and other senior officials are fond of saying that at last the U.S. has got the "inputs'' right in Afghanistan -- the right strategy, enough troops and other resources -- and now it's time to let those inputs work. And they have to work before next July, when the president has promised to begin withdrawing U.S. troops, on the assumption that Afghan security forces will be good enough, and the Taliban battered enough, that fewer Americans will be needed.

Skepticism on that score is deep and widespread. Traveling through Afghanistan this summer, I spoke to many ground combat commanders, all of whom felt excited and optimistic about the strategy. But all of them said it would take years to take effect.

In Washington, there is growing concern about that disconnect between Obama's announced strategy, which rests heavily on long-term counterinsurgency tactics developed by Petraeus, and the July 2011 "transition'' date. There is little confidence that the goals Obama set can be reached by then. And in that case, what is the acceptable goal, and what is the real strategy?

A second cause of doubt about the future is Afghan President Hamid Karzai, portrayed in journalist Bob Woodward's book, "Obama's Wars," as a manic-depressive who according to U.S. officials occasionally goes "off his meds.'' The senior U.S. diplomat in Kabul, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, has argued that Karzai is corrupt and incompetent and unfit as a strategic partner in the war. If that is the case, on whose behalf is the United States fighting?

Last week Karzai again lashed out at the United States and the troops of 46 other nations deployed in Afghanistan, complaining that after nine years of war there is no discernible progress.

"NATO is here and they say they are fighting terrorism, and this is the 10th year and there is no result yet," Karzai groused in the Sept. 28 speech. "Our sons cannot go to school because of bombs and suicide attacks...It has been about 10 years...and "the result remains unclear."

Small wonder that the public has turned decisively against what was once a proud instance of American muscle-flexing. When President Bush announced on Oct. 7, 2001, that "the United States military has begun strikes against al-Qaeda training camps ...'' a palpable thrill of pride electrified the country.

But now, public opinion polls show most Americans think it was a bad idea, that the United States is not winning, and that it will probably get worse.

In the face of mounting public doubts about the war -- and detailed accounts by Woodward of deep disagreements over strategy within the Obama administration -- senior administration officials find themselves having to insist they know what they're doing. Typical was an exchange at the Pentagon news briefing last week with Gates.

Question: "A year after the Afghan strategy review, can you both say without reservation that the strategy that emerged is coherent and sound enough to justify the expenditure of American lives and money?''

Gates, sharply: "Yes. I wouldn't sign the deployment orders if I didn't believe that.''